

MV Havfrakt



Marine Casualty Investigation report

**Grounding of MV Havfrakt onto Island of Olaholmen,
Norway, 24.10.2010.**

This report is based upon information from following parties:
The Captain MV Havfrakt - The Chief Officer MV Havfrakt - The Owners MV Havfrakt –
The webpage of Loyd's Register – The webpage of Bureau Veritas

Investigation of Maritime Accidents

The Faroese Maritime Authority is responsible for investigating accidents and serious occupational accidents on Faroese merchant and fishing vessels. The Faroese Maritime Authority also investigates accidents at sea on foreign ships in Faroese waters.

Purpose

The purpose of the investigation is to clarify the actual sequence of events leading to the accident. With this information in hand, others can take measures to prevent similar accidents in the future.

The aim of the investigations is not to establish legal or economic liability.

Reporting obligation

When a Faroese merchant or fishing vessel has been involved in a serious accident at sea, the Faroese Maritime Authority must be informed immediately.

Address:

Faroese Maritime Authority,
Post Office Box. 326,
375 Miðvágur,
Faroe Islands

Tel + 298 355600
Fax +298 355601
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Attachments

Attachment No.1: Havfrakt, Report form concerning accidents

Attachment no 2: Drawing - vessel sitting aground – report from divers

Attachment no 3: Extract from Electronic Chart MVHavfrakt

Vessel key information

Ship's Name: Havfrakt
Flag: Faroe Islands
Call Sign: OZ2056
L.o.a: 65,82 m
Beam: 10,70 m
Max Draft: 4,31 m
Owners: Frakt & Sand Sp/F,
Runavik, Faroe Islands
Class society: Lloyd's Register
SMC No.: D18612/101021F
(Norsk Veritas)

Summary

On 24 October 2010 at 01:35 Hrs LT MV Havfrakt grounded onto the Island of Olaholmen.

Vessel was on an inshore coastal voyage in Norway.

During the passage of Finnsnes Renna the ship went aground.

The vessel suffered severe damage to bottom plating and structures.

No leakage detected.

After lightering part of the cargo to other vessel, MV Havfrakt floated free of the ground, and proceeded by own engine to the port of Finnsnes.

No personal injury, neither any pollution was reported.

The Captain, who was experienced trading the area, carried Norwegian local trading permit (“fartsbevis”).

The Chief Officer, who was Officer Of the Watch (OOW) during the incident had insufficient experience in the trading area, and did not hold a “fartsbevis”.

Log of events

23.10.2010
05:10 MV Havfrakt departure Halsø
24.10.2010
00:00 Two Nautical Miles North East of Dyrø Lykte
00:00 Change of bridge watch keeping officer: Chief Mate takes over the watch
01: 17 Passing Klauvskj. Light tower on the port side
01:29 Course altered 45 degrees to Starboard
01:35 The ship runs aground at Island of Olaholmen
01:45 Havfrakt calls via VHF KV (KystVakt) Svalbard – KV Nordkap replies
01:53 The owners informed about the grounding
01:57 Engine and cargo spaces inspected, no leaks detected
01:40 High tide in Finnsnes Renna
03:10 KV Nordkap attempts towing Havfrakt off the ground
03:35 KV Nordkap leaves the scene
05:35 MV Ocean Supplier on the scene, relieves KV Nordkap
26.10.2010
00:05 MV Trine Charlotte on the scene
00:20 MV Trine Charlotte moored SB side MV Havfrakt
00:35 Start lightering cargo from Havfrakt to Trine Charlotte
03:15 Havfrakt refloated
03:19 High Tide in Finnsnes Renna
03:19 Trine Charlotte cast off
03:19 Havfrakt on its way by own engine
04:25 Havfrakt alongside in Finnsnes

Narrative

MV Havfrakt departed Halsá 23.10.2010 at 05:50 Hrs LT.
Vessel was carrying 550 tonnes fishmeal.

Captain and Chief Mate were rotating the bridge watch, 6 hours on and 6 hours off.

Morning 24.10.2010 at 00:00 hrs LT, the Captain was relieved as OOW by the Chief Mate.

The weather good, visibility good. No traffic in vicinity.

After being relieved, the Captain left the navigation bridge.

After a while he was back to the navigation bridge.

Upon returning to the navigation bridge, the Captain assured himself that all navigational matters were normal. Subsequently he seated in a chair in the aft end of the navigation bridge SB side.

On approaching Finnsnes Renna the course is altered 45 degrees to starboard.

Vessel proceeds inside the green sector of Olaholmen Light House.

Closing in on Finnsnes Renna the course is altered slightly to port in order to keep all green lights/buoys on SB side.

At 01:34 Hrs, when closing in on Olaholmen Light House, the leading light from the light house changes from green to white.

At this stage the OOW recognises that the vessel is not following the planned track.

A few seconds later the vessel runs aground at Island of Olaholmen, with a distance of eight meters to the lighthouse.

Narrative continued..

Course and speed at time of grounding: 000 degrees and 10 knots.

Master calls the engine full power astern, however, in vain.

The vessel takes a 25 degrees list to starboard.

At 03:10 KV Nordkap attempts to tow Havfrakt off the ground. The attempt fails.

Diver inspections reveal that vessel's bottom plating is resting onto the seabed in two positions. See attachment no.2.

On the 26.10.2010 at 03:15 Hrs, after lightering half of the cargo carried, MS Havfrakt floated off the ground at high tide.

Once safely moored alongside in Finnsnes, the Norwegian Maritime Directorate carried out a PSC. Only one deficiency: Hull cracking. This deficiency most likely originated from the grounding.

Conclusion

The immediate cause of the grounding is the OOW observing the green sector of Olaholmen Light house as being the third and final green light buoy to be kept on vessel's starboard side.

Until a few seconds prior to running aground this observation remains valid.

When closing in on Finnsnes Renna the three green light buoys sheltering Finnesskjæret have been almost aligned.

It is believed that the OOW has observed two of the buoys as only one. Thus, when counting, the green sector at Olaholmen Lighthouse is the third green navigation aid to be kept at vessel's starboard side.

It is the opinion of the Faroese Maritime Authority that the following factors contributed to – and are the underlying causes to the grounding of MV Havfrakt:

- Insufficient follow-up on course alteration
- No Bridge lookout posted ¹⁾
- Cross checking of vessel's position insufficient
- Passage planning not followed
- Lack of attention to safe navigation
- OOW disrupted by city lights (troubling identification of navigational aids).

¹⁾ According to the “Table of Shipboard working arrangements” from Havfrakt, no (nil) crewmembers are allocated as bridge lookout.

This does not meet the bridge watch-keeping procedure requirements valid for the vessel.

Recommendations

- 1) During non daylight hours a bridge look-out must be posted.
- 2) During daylight hours a look-out should be posted based upon the Captain's evaluation (ref. rules and regulations in force).
- 3) When trading narrow passages, vessel's position should be ascertained by at least two different position fixing methods.
- 4) When trading narrow passages vessel's position must be fixed at short intervals.
- 5) Navigational observations must be questioned – and repeated.
- 6) It should be considered allocating two OOW during passage of narrow and shallow waters. One in charge of navigation – and one supporting the navigation officer in all aspects of the navigation.
- 7) All passage planning details must be thoroughly discussed amongst the navigation officers prior to start of each voyage, and during handover while en route. This including, although not limited to special precautions to be exercised while transiting areas requiring increased navigational attention.

Attachment No.1

Síða/Page I av/of 5
Tá skipið sigldi á land / Vessel ground collision

Oyðublað til fráboðan av vanlukkum/óhappum á sjónum

Report form concerning accidents/incidents at sea



Oyðublað skal fyllast út og sendast til:

Skipaefirlitið
Postboks 26
370 Miðvágur
Telefax 35 56 01
E-mail: fma@fma.fo
www.fma.fo

Tilfar av týðningi, so sum myndir, útskriftir (dáta) frá navigatiónstólum, skrivligar frágreiðingar og manningarlisti skulu leggjast við.



The report must be completed and set to:

Faroese Maritime Authority
P.O. Box 26
FO-375 Miðvágur
Faroe Islands
Telefax 35 56 01
E-mail: fma@fma.fo

Relevant material such as pictures, printed data from navigational equipment, written reports and crew list must be attached.

Skipaefirlitið (SE)

SE hevur ábyrgdina av at kanna vanlukkur/óhapp og álvarsligan fólkaskaða, ið er farin fram á sjónum.

Endamálið við kannningini er at útvega upplýsingar um vanlukkur/óhapp og at fáa greiðu á tilburðargongd og orsøkum, ið hava við sær, at vanlukkur/óhapp henda. Hetta til tess at SE kann taka neyðug stig til at minka um vandan fyri at tilíkar vanlukkur/óhapp henda aftur.

SE hevur onga ávirkan á møguligar revsirættarligar- ella endurgjaldsspurningar í sambandi við vanlukkur/óhapp.

Skipaefirlitið hevur tagnarskildu í øllum málum um vanlukkur/óhapp á sjónum, meðan málið verður kanna.

Faroese Maritime Authority (FMA)

FMA is responsible for the investigation of accidents/incidents concerning damage to people and property at sea.

The purpose of these investigations is to determine the sequence of events and factors who contributed to the accident/incident, to enable FMA to prevent and decrease the frequency of accidents/incidents.

FMA has no influence on possible criminal law or insurance issues in connection with accidents/incidents.

FMA has confidentiality in all investigations of accidents/incidents during the investigation period.

Attachment No.1 continued..

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Heildar-upplýsingar

Frágreiðing um vanlukkur/óhapp á sjónum.

General information

Report concerning accident/incident at sea.

1	Skipanavn, kallibókstavar og IMO nr.	Vessel name, call sign and IMO no.
Havfrakt OZ2056 Imo no. 7716490		
2	Slag av skipi (slag av fiskiskipi).	Vessel type (type of fishing vessel).
General cargo vessel		
3	Dagfesting, tíð (sone) og staður/knøttstöða.	Date, time (local time) & Place/position
24 october 2010 0135 lt Oldholmen pos 69 14 N 017 53 E		
4	Veðrið (vindur, streymur, ísur og sýni) regn, kavi o.s.fr.	Weather (wind, tide, ice & visibility) rain, snow etc.
Fair weather Visibilty good Tide setting north approx. 1,0 knots		
5	Skipari (navn, bústaður, tlf. nr. innubræv, tíð um borð, royndir á sjónum). Tilhald skiparans í hendingini ?	Master (name, address tel. no. certificate of competency, time onboard, experience at sea) Master whereabouts during incident ?
[REDACTED]		
6	Fólk á brúnni – vakthavandi, kagtænastu og róðurgangari (tign, navn, vinnubræv, útbúgving, tíð um borð, royndir á sjónum).	People on wheel house – watch keeper, lookout, helmsman (rank, name, certificate, education, time onboard, experience at sea).
[REDACTED]		
7	Løstað/skadd og onnur uppi í vanlukkuni/ óhappinum og hvar vóru tey stødd tign, navn, vinnubræv, tbúgving, tíð um orð, tíð á sjónum).	Injured/hurt and other parties in accident/ incident and whereabouts, rank, name, certificate, education, time onboard, experience at sea).
None injured.		
8	Fráfaringarstaður og fráfaringartíð, hvat slag av farni er/var umborð.	Place of departure and departure time, cargo type is/was onboard
Halsa 23/10 0510. Fishmeal 550 mt		
9	Hvat verður hildið at vera orsök til óhappi/vanlukkuna?	Estimated cause of accident/incident.
Mistook navigational aids. Navigated on the wrong side of the lighted beacon tower, showing flashing green light		

Attachment No.1 continued..

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Skipaefirlitið
Faroese Maritime Authority

just prior the grounding.

The lighted tower was mistaken from the lighted buoy (also flashing green).

The weather was good with calm seas. This contributed with reflection of the lights in the sea, from the villages on both sides, disturbed the mate and led to the misjudgment of the green lights.

Síða/Page 4 av/of 5		 Skipaerumio <small>Faroese Maritime Authority</small>
Tá skipið sigldi á land		Vessel ground collision
10	Skaðafrágreiðing.	<i>Incident report.</i>
Ship bottom inspected by divers. One crack found in tank 3, Small indents found, and a few long stripes in the shell plates on tank 1 and forepeak.		
11	Seinasta knøttstøða, áðrenn tað setti. Knøttstøða tá tað setti. Nær og hvussu vóru knøttstøðurnar staðfestar?	<i>Last known possition prior to grounding/collition. Possition of incident site. Method and time of determining positions.</i>
At 0117 lt radar bearing was taken to "Klavskj. Leading light tower" 270° range 0,3Nm (Pos: 69°11'8N - 018°01'3E)		
12	Greinan av siglingini frá seinastu knøttstøðu, áðrenn tað setti til tað setti.	<i>Explination of navigation from last possition, from the last known possition, until the collition.</i>
When passing green light buoy at Finnesgr. Course was set to 000°. As of this moment the two green flashing lights have been in line, thus only one green flashing light was observed and the vessel was on planned track. When getting closer and having the green light on the port side, course was slightly altered to port in order to keep the green light on our starboard side. Here is where the misjudgement of lights happens, as the focus on the green light is set on the wrong light tower.		
13	Kós og ferð tá tað setti.	<i>Course and speed at time of grounding.</i>
Course at the time of grounding was north speed 10 knots.		
14	Hvør navigatíonsútgerð var nýtt?	<i>Navigation equipment used ?</i>
Navigated with paper charts and electronic charts until the grounding. Radar		
15	Var stýrt við sjálvstýrara ella við róðurgangara?	<i>Was steering maintained by autopilot or helmsman ?</i>
The steering was maintained by autopilot until few seconds prior to the grounding, where it was changed over to helm. (in order to increase the distance to the lighted tower)		
16	Nær og hvussuleiðis var staðfest, at vandi var fyri, at skipið fór at renna á land?	<i>Time and explination of determining, risk of collition ?</i>
The danger was came clear few seconds prior to the ground, as the lighted tower changed from flashing green to yellow.		
17	Hvat var gjørt fyri, at skipið ikki skuldi renna á land, eftir at staðfest var, at vandi var fyri at renna á land?	<i>Preventive Actions taken after determining risk of ground collision.</i>

Attachment No.1 continued..

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At this point nothing could be done unless colliding with the lighted tower.

18	Nær og hvussuleiðis var skipið flotað aftur?	<i>Time and used method of refloating vessel ?</i>
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The vessel is still aground

19	Er olja ella annað, ið kann hava dálkað umhvørvið, líkið á sjógvi?	<i>Has oil or other pollutant liquids escapet to sea ?</i>
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No oil has leaked out.


20	Hvør fekk fráboðan um, at skipið hevði siglt á land ? og/um biðið er/var um hjálp, so frá hvørjum og nær?	<i>Who revievd the notification explaining the grounding ? If applicable (time of requesting assistance and from whom)</i>
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**The coast guard and owners were informed right away.
 Assistance in towing the vessel off again was requested to the coast guard, and a coast guard vessel "Nordkap" which was close by came to our request.**

21	Møguligar upplýsingar fra ECDIS ella Voyage Data Recorder (VDR). (Leggið við møguligar útskriftir).	<i>Possible information from ECDIS or Voyage Data Recorde (VDR). (Attach possible prints.)</i>
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22	Fleiri upplýsingar	<i>Additional information.</i>
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Attachment No.2



Attachment No.3



SJÓVINNUSTÝRIÐ

FAROESE MARITIME AUTHORITY

